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1. ORIGINS, STRUCTURE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The European Union has early declared its intentions about creating the 
common/internal market, in the Treaty of Rome. Several factors – development of 
technology, increasing trade of services and the liberalisation of internal service markets in 
the most developed countries – have led the European Union to open its markets of services. 
With the services market liberalisation and the approval of services directive (2006/123/EC) 
in 2006, the EU has reflected the objective of bringing the advantages of a competition-
determined services market closer to everyone.  
Opening up these markets to competition means higher efficiency and welfare. Its 
essence is to provide/assure the same conditions to all suppliers/actors of a service market. 
Competition and market-based services can help the internal market and also EU 
competitiveness. So the aim is to assure that the quality and prices of public services – as 
input providers to other sectors – is determined by competition. Thanks to these processes 
fundamental changes took place in the structure and function of European energy markets in 
the last decade.  
The success of energy market liberalisation is proven by several international 
examples. Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and the United 
Kingdom are all markets where convincing advantages like possibility of options, better 
quality of services and lower prices prove the idea of market opening. European roots of gas 
market liberalisation can be found in the restructuring of the British market. Having seen its 
success the European Economic Community has also chosen this path. Although a decade has 
already passed, the market opening and the creation of gas market competition is still in  
progress/ongoing owing to the basic conditions and characteristics of the sector. Moreover, 
several factors oppose the liberalisation. This is a sector where we cannot forget national 
interests, it has network-based structure, gas service is an originally non-competitive public 
service, where still several vertically integrated company has dominant position. The 
regulation of this specific sector is sometimes too complicated or just follows the trends. 
There is a lack of compelling tools on EU-level, and we find low political commitment owing 
to the differences and lower investment appetite because of the economic crisis. These 
conditions, characteristics and opposing factors are standing in the centre of my research. The 
tracking/mapping of good direction is challenged by new institutions in the regulation, by the 
liberalisation process pushed by Brussels, as well as by uncertainties of supply.  
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During liberalisation we must keep in view that besides the well-
functioning/prospering internal market and consumer welfare, the EU’s energy policy must 
provide global competitiveness and freedom of investments to European energy companies. 
With the help of correlation and cooperation the EU must start conversation with 
producing/extracting countries. Interconnecting the importing and member state networks 
would make the internal gas market more flexible and adaptable, and could also pool member 
states stronger. 
1.1. ABOUT THE TOPIC 
My interest toward the topic rose when I wrote a teaching material about competition, 
industry and trade policy of the EU in 2006-2007 within the framework of an EU-funded 
project. In my opinion gas market liberalisation and the intention of creating common 
European energy market reflect the good combination of these three policies. Energy market 
liberalisation requires the cooperation of several traditional common policies. Malfunctioning 
internal market conditions and the rising dependence of EU member states appear 
increasingly in energy services. Disorders appearing in one country’s energy supply have 
immediate and direct effects on neighbouring member states because of the structure 
organised on network basis, or rather because of its shortcomings. Member states shall create 
and follow common policy/answers to the questions of sustainable energy supply, security of 
supply and competitiveness.
1
 European energy policy integrates/settles/focuses all necessary 
steps into three main objectives: getting over the challenges of climate change (1), limiting the 
EU's external vulnerability to imported hydrocarbons (2), and contributing to the growth and 
jobs objectives in long term within this policy as well (3). According to the EU’s intentions 
these objectives shall be fulfilled by the help of stabile energy supply on affordable prices that 
evolved by competition on the energy markets (CEC 2007). From the wide topic presented 
above I’ve decided to concentrate especially on the challenges of gas service sector 
liberalisation.  
Furthermore the narrowed topic has different levels. In my research I used the 
approach of Marján (2007), and I have created at least three main sequentials which are 
interlinked. There is a broader scale that contains the global challenges of gas market. From 
the energy policy objectives addressing climate change belongs here. The questions of energy 
                                                 
1 However energy market and geopolitical conditions have changed basically since the signing of the Treaty of European 
Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the Treaty of European Atomic Energy Community, the common action in energy 
policy is of higher importance than ever (CEC 2007).  
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policy and environment will be mentioned only superficially. I rather examine in detail the 
effects of the 2008 economic crisis on energy sectors, since the tools – affecting energy 
efficiency, green energy management and the results of liberalisation – used for crisis 
management in the past three years may redefine the frameworks and future of EU energy 
policy.  
The next scale of the topic is the Pan-European level of energy policy. In my view 
serious questions of common energy policy – so the second objective, the decrease of reliance 
on imports of gas – belong here.  
Finally the basic scale of the topic is the condition of the sector or markets. Every 
characteristic that determine the upper levels’ efficiency belong here. Fixed, original 
technology, slightly changing market structure, barriers to entry and distorted conditions of 
competition are all making it more and more difficult to achieve the third energy policy 
objective, the stimulation of growth and jobs.  
The aim of gas market liberalisation is to provide natural gas within/through the same 
competitive conditions, on prices that became set under competitive market mechanisms. The 
European Union plans to create these conditions in three steps. The first is the separation of 
different activities of supply chain (unbundling), the second is to provide the access of third 
parties to the naturally non-competitive transmission systems and the third will be the 
regulation, supervision of prices and tariffs.  
For the first challenge – the separation of different activities (extraction/production, 
transport/transmission, storage and sale/supply) – we must know the structure of gas markets. 
Natural gas market doesn’t belong to the competitive structures of economies. Unbundling is 
an essential tool for introducing competition into those segments of the market where it is 
possible.  
The second step is to provide third party access (TPA). Regulation must pull down 
market entry barriers in order to let new entrants appear on markets. 98/30/EC directive 
contains the necessary steps in connection with the entrance possibilities and competition 
regulation provides the non-discriminatory background.  
The third step, the question of prices and tariffs is not emphasised in my dissertation. 
The reason for this is that prices and tariffs have more national relevancy up till now, it does 
not belong to EU level challenges yet.  
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1.2. THE OBJECTIVES – HYPOTHESES  
The principal background of the experiments of creating competitive conditions 
through the opening of gas markets seems to be stable, but its success in practice could be 
questioned. EU-level guidelines, factors and interests introduced in my dissertation highlight 
some open questions.  
Sometimes already outdated regulation can first yield the place to up-to-date 
regulation that establishes competitive framework and then to market mechanisms anywhere 
where liberalisation is possible and so dynamic development may be foreseen. During the 
examination of liberalisation process I searched whether market mechanisms can take place 
from regulation or in this field of economies regulation shall be maintained by all conditions.  
Hypothesis 1: Several factors may appear during the re-organisation of network 
industries, especially in the natural gas sector that can render or make impossible the 
introduction of market mechanism. So the time when regulation is giving place to 
market mechanisms may not come along. 
The examination of the paths/routes of different member states also belongs to the 
evaluation of the success of liberalisation process. But during the examination we must not 
forget about the different take-off/starting conditions and the possibilities stemming from 
them. My research is based on the fact that huge differences can be revealed among the 
energy profile – for example in gas market structure, state intervention, security of supply or 
other factors – of the member states (Hira – Amaya 2003, Pointvogl 2009). My basic 
assumption that member states are not on the same level either in their gas market or in their 
future possibilities can be originated from the Tindemans Report in 1976. The conception of 
two-speed Europe appeared later also in connection with the introduction of common 
currency, the euro and with the Schengen Area (Csaba 2006, Marján 2007). But today in the 
debates over currency and/or fiscal union and the overall future of the European Union this 
conception seems to be more actual than ever (Merkel: kétsebességes… 2012). So I think that 
if liberalisation process comes off, it will not directly bring more intensive competition and 
does not directly mean the appearance of new entrants, since only the establishment of 
competitive conditions is the aim of the process.  
Hypothesis 2: In view of knowing the different gas market conditions the follow-up of 
liberalisation milestones will not automatically bring competitive gas markets.  
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The growing number of competition distortion cases related to the energy markets 
refers to that competitive conditions are able to change the plans over competitive gas 
markets as well. The cases and decisions made by the Commission or national authorities 
support the liberalisation process in the creation of competitive sub-markets. Are these cases 
single examples, which do not require further explanation or they appear en masse within 
national markets and are part of a longer rearranging process? In my point of view the 
European Union further deepens already existing differences/gaps between member states 
with the maintenance of three options on vertical activity unbundling. 
Hypothesis 3: Different levels in the commitments towards gas market liberalisation 
and the establishment of options in unbundling may be able to maintain or even 
generate serious differences within the EU.  
Beside energetic companies, the approach of member states determines the success 
and results of the liberalisation process. It seems that the efforts of the EU and the results in 
the unbundling and third party access are highly determined by national gas market 
conditions at the very start of the restructuring. The question rises whether it is able to enforce 
gas market competition through liberalisation, or over EU-level regulation some other factors 
may be necessary as well. 
Hypothesis 4: It seems that adversary incumbents or even national-level political or 
governmental groups may resist with improper adaptation or application of EU level 
regulation. This way they are able to influence regulation procedure in long term. 
Finally, I examine how energetics have survived the economic crisis that became even 
more serious for European states. Has the crisis touched, if yes in what ways the natural gas 
and generally the energetic sectors? I’ve searched the different tasks devoted to energy sectors 
within EU-level or national crisis management. 
Hypothesis 5: Energetics was also hit by the crisis, but the turmoil has not have only 
negative effects on it.  
Assuming my hypothesis is true, my question is: how national gas markets showing 
huge differences can provide appropriate basis to the EU-level energy cooperation, and how 
can these separate markets meet legal, competitive and future efficiency challenges coming 
also from the liberalisation process? My aim is to chart/map/examine the results of gas 
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market liberalisation up to now, the new conditions and possibilities coming from competition 
and the crisis. I further amend this with an empirical research.  
1.3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION  
The dissertation has three parts. In the first chapter I introduce natural gas supply as 
one of the public services. I describe its characteristics, since these determine the 
liberalisation process significantly. Later I examine the conditions that come from its network 
structure. I further concentrate my view around the product, which is the basis of the whole 
industry. I draw up the supply chain, its separable segments and their structure in general. 
After the introduction of the basic liberalisation principles, objectives and its necessity 
I deal with the difficulties of public service market opening and its regulatory obligations. 
Finally I introduce the potentials of gas market liberalisation and its effects on energy policy, 
security of supply and environmental policy.  
The second chapter contains the market opening scenario drawn by the European 
Union. Here those national or company level reactions are introduced which influence the 
sector’s liberalisation process and so the desired competitive conditions. I describe the 
possible options of unbundling offered by the European Union for companies. At the end of 
the chapter I highlight those new challenges faced by competition control that come from 
recently created competitive conditions, their handling methods and the problems in 
connection with them.  
The third part of the dissertation contains the empirical research that I have made 
using the latest accessible, 2007-2009 data.  
1.4. THE METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH  
During my work I have used different methodologies. First I have examined the 
natural gas sector by the help of economic theory and its analysing measures. I’ve created the 
combination of economic perspective examination and policy perspective based on market 
analysis.  
The theoretical analysis is supported by an empirical study. I prove with statistical data 
that according to different reasons – for example the differences in the level of national gas 
market liberalisation, in the basic market structure or the options in unbundling offered by the 
EU – after more than a decade of market opening we cannot say that liberalisation and so 
principles of competition define market developments. 
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During the empirical research those indicators remained where the source was reliable 
and as far as possible contained information about every member state. I could collect data in 
connection with 23 member states.
2
 Finally, I had to compress the applied indicators into 
factors that reflect national characteristics, and aggregated them into three groups. One refers 
to the basic conditions a country must face, which can be changed only in longer term. The 
second group of factors deals with market structure. By the help of the third group we can 
assess the level of governmental interventions and the legal barriers of market entry. I admit 
that I agree with the opinions of Jamasb and Pollitt (2008) and Pointvogl (2009) about that 
although these factors can be interpreted individually, because of their interaction we shall not 
handle them irrespectively from each other.  
In view of the factors I first chose multidimensional scaling (MDS), since in this data 
reducing method the result shows not only a rank of development, but I could receive 
information about the position of examined countries related to each other. Later on it was 
obvious to aggregate member states according to the artificial factors, so I have used the 
method of hierarchical clusters.  
2. THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH  
Energy market status in the 21
st
 century shows higher interdependence, which appears 
both in the energy supply, the stabile energy market and even in climate change determined 
by energy consumption. The European Union has a definite position for the interconnection of 
these phenomena. This is the application of new technologies inspired and provided through 
the objectives of gas market liberalisation (competitiveness, sustainability and security of 
energy supply). Thus by the liberalisation process well-functioning, competitive markets can 
develop, the diversification of supply can evolve beside the decreasing effects of energy 
consumption on surrounding environment.  
Thesis 1: Through the examination of gas market regulation I’ve found that in spite of 
every damage caused by regulative mechanisms, liberalisation in this sector will not 
mean deregulation, but the reform of regulation, so re-regulation. 
The EU’s gas market liberalisation, the creation of competitive conditions is not a 
single action but a process and we have not yet reached its end. Liberalisation and 
competition evolve easier on those public service markets where technology helps or induces 
                                                 
2 Almost every studies and market analysis missed Bulgarian and Romanian data at that time. The reason is that the natural 
gas consumption of the latter two countries is around zero (EC 2009). 
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the changes. The gas services, in the centre of my research, can be a counter-example, since 
on a market defined by long-term supply/input contracts, constructed by network structure 
and bound by stabile market entry barriers, creating competitive markets is a slow and 
difficult process.  
Gas market does not belong to those network industries where liberalisation and 
dynamic development is easy to achieve, and so simple early type regulation that substituted 
competition can give its place to an up-to-date and complex version and later even to market 
mechanisms. I have found several factors that render it more difficult and on some segments 
even impossible to complete this process. Regulation must handle these factors both for 
competitive and integration purposes, because competitive conditions can be created and the 
security of supply can be assured only by the help of this artificial way. Some characteristics 
that make re-regulation indispensable:  
- the original non-competitive nature that comes from the product characteristic and so 
the organisation of gas market sub-segments; 
- the public service nature of the market and the supply activity, because of which the 
state is likely to be unable to leave the operation of gas market in short term, 
especially in case of a liberalisation process induced from upper levels; 
- the network structure of the sector, and all its consequences that determine sub-
markets and their competitiveness; 
- the general devolutive nature of different gas market players; 
- and finally the necessary establishment of new institutions with supranational 
authority for the common natural gas market purposes. Where supranational level 
enters as a new aspect, regulation does not seem to be avoidable, but it will be an 
uncompletable process. 
Regulation is changing and developing constantly since new circumstances and 
challenges – like the liberalisation process, crises or security of supply problems – always 
appear and they need continuous reaction. The precession/development of liberalisation 
process brings more and more challenges for regulators. That is why although regulation is 
developing, owing to the long consultation processes and the complicated EU decision-
making it seems that it is only following market changes, instead of the original intentions to 
induce competition.  
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Thesis 2: Even the best possible regulation seems to be useless, if the possibility to 
create competitive background is not given to all member states. It looks like the 
creation of this background is impossible until more input options develop for all.  
Member state or service provider dependency – coming from the low number of 
supply or input possibilities – hits more countries from the EU, like the Baltic states, Finland, 
Sweden and some Central and Eastern European countries as well. Among such 
circumstances liberalisation, market opening and so the development of competition-based 
prices seem to play second fiddle. Such deficiencies of the gas market structure are of 
elementary importance, and they determine the support, the success and the results of 
liberalisation process. Although more member states are dependent from one single natural 
gas importer, those mechanisms and interconnection that may provide security and solidarity 
between member states in case of an energy crisis are still missing. The following measures 
may provide options for the majority of member states: 
- further interconnection of already existing transmission systems may provide the 
better allocation/exploitation of cross-border capacities, would assure the connection 
to “new” root/extracting markets, and intensify input competition; 
- input diversification, the increase of options in the sources of natural gas, through the 
investments of questing and establishing new importing markets.  
The handling of the above-mentioned deficiencies and the future success of 
liberalisation got new impetus with the establishment of Gas Target Model (GTM).
3
 This 
could be a key measure to exploit advantages of gas market opening for those countries, 
which until now could not feel its positive results because of their physical conditions and 
supply possibilities. The further interconnection of importing, long-distance transmission and 
national distribution networks would not only result more flexible and adaptive internal gas 
market but could also league countries with similar interests.  
Input diversification must be mentioned because of the security of supply. This 
contains the possibility of competitive intermodal or substituting inputs, thus technological 
demonopolisation as well. In longer term, establishing the substitution of different type 
energy sources (or the same from different origins) may decrease the energy import 
dependency even of the whole European Union.  
                                                 
3 The conception of the Gas Target Model was accepted by European Gas Regulatory Forum, so called Madrid Forum in 
March 23, 2012 (Beckman 2012). 
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Thesis 3: Considering the competition cases of gas market (or in general the energetic 
sectors) the liberalisation process does not bring the appearance of new actors 
automatically, since its aim is only to create the possibility of competition. But with 
the unbundling options provided by the EU, gas market concentration may also be a 
consequence of European gas market opening.  
Gas market organised by network structure is determined by numerous market entry 
barriers. In an industry where complementariness and compatibility is necessary, where 
expensive patents and security is of highest importance, where costs of conversion and lock in 
effects appear, and only reaching the level of economies of scale could help surviving in 
longer term, the appearance of a new competitive actor/player needs more and more time. In 
turn the length of the period of successful market entering is an important determinant from 
the aspect of the structure and the competition of an industry. On European gas markets the 
physical accessibility of sub-segments is not even equal, which means a natural market entry 
barrier. Beside this elementary difference the technology, the missing demand replaceability, 
the information asymmetries and the lack of market transparency are all structural market 
entry barriers for newcomers. After defining and handling strategic – and in favourable 
situation natural – market entry barriers, the EU considers the three options of unbundling the 
activities of vertically integrated companies as the engine of liberalisation. Beside the risk of 
the obligate separation, the provided options also render the establishment of EU-level 
competition more difficult. This way it became possible for active, vertically integrated 
incumbents to survive the liberalisation process. We can see it on several sub-markets of 
natural gas supply that instead of more competition, the original situation has remained or 
markets have become more concentrated.  
Other consequence of the unbundling options introduced for separation is that earlier 
vertically integrated European companies that chose ownership unbundling weakened. Not 
only the wealthy-in-capital European actors recognized new investment possibilities, but 
separated companies became defenceless targets for supplier companies (Gazprom, 
Sonatrach, Statoil) outside the EU as well. This means that even if concentration indicators 
decreased, the ownership background of the separated companies may not represent the same 
process. The ownership networks and the interlocking of affiliated companies hold 
information for further research.  
It seems to be controversial, but energy market concentrations are logical 
consequences of liberalisation process. Market players seek efficiency through economies of 
12 
 
scale and economies of scope to avoid uncertainty and price volatility. Moreover the sense of 
liberalisation is to reach an even more integrated and common energy market within the EU. 
Bigger market means bigger companies, who are able to be more efficient. Accordingly there 
is a constant pressure for the authorisation of mergers and fusions. Examination of each case 
and the commitments related to the approvals try to handle those competition-distorting 
situations which are not covered by regulation. European control over energy markets and the 
numerous decisions in each case complete the regulation of energy market opening.   
Thesis 4: Beyond the early conditions and the EU’s commitments, the possibilities of 
single actors in influencing and sabotaging the obligate market opening will determine 
the level of energetic supplier competition on each market.  
My empirical research verifies this thesis. In short and middle terms the indicators that 
determine the national-level conditions of competition depend on member state/governmental 
decisions. In Table 1 I introduce those indicators that are involved in the research.  
Table 1: The indicators of the research  
Indicators of basic conditions Indicators of market structure Indicators that are barriers to 
effective competition  
Energy consumption per capita  Market structure Scope of public enterprise sector  
Gas import dependency  Number of Transmission System 
Operators (TSO)  
Governmental involvement in 
network industries  
Possibilities of import 
diversification  
Number of ownership separated TSOs  Price controls on gas markets – 
regulated tariffs 
 Number of gas producer/importer 
companies with over 5% of market share  
Legal barriers to entry  
 Share of 3 biggest companies (by 
available gas)  
Antitrust exemptions for public 
enterprises 
 Number of Distribution System 
Operators (DSO) 
Entry regulation in Gas industry 
 Number of legally separated DSOs  Proportion of gas market open to 
competition 
 Number of ownership separated DSOs  Vertical integration in gas industry 
 Number of nation-wide suppliers   
 Number of companies with market share 
over 5%  
 
 Share of 3 biggest companies in whole 
retail market  
 
Source: Own edition. 
Basic conditions are those which are not able to change in short or middle terms. The 
indicators that determine market structure must be supervised by national authorities 
according to EU regulation. But the three options for separation give big freedom for 
energetic companies. The third group of indicators shows those circumstances that can be 
kept irrespective of the objectives of the EU. Although not in the above-mentioned separation, 
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but these indicators show the national positions in the range of development by gas market 
liberalisation.  
I could create 5 hierarchical clusters (Figure 1) according to the artificial factors by the 
national results in gas market liberalisation and by governmental activity in the sector.  
Figure 1: Spatial representation of member states made by gas market liberalisation 
and governmental involvement  
 
mds1: Competitive market, mds2: Level of government involvement 
Explanation: Different symbols show the members of the 5 clusters. 
Explanation: Ausztria=Austria, Csehország=Czech Republic, Dánia=Denmark, Egyesült 
Királyság=United Kingdom, Észtország=Estonia, Finnország=Finland, Franciaország=France, 
Görögország=Greece, Hollandia=The Netherlands, Írország=Ireland, Lengyelország=Poland, 
Lettország=Latvia, Litvánia=Lithuania, Magyarország=Hungary, Németország=Germany, 
Olaszország=Italy, Portugália=Portugal, Spanyolország=Spain, Svédország=Sweden, 
Szlovákia=Slovakia, Szlovénia=Slovenia.  
Source: Own edition based on the SPSS output. 
The results represented on Figure 1 give good explanation to understand different 
interests of member states in the disputes over common energy policy, their standing point 
and the level of acceptance of EU level energy regulation. During the empirical examination 
of member states’ gas markets it became verified that those countries show the highest level 
of liberalisation which are able to cover their energy demand from more sources – like 
Germany and Italy – or those who have significant inland natural gas production – like 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The countries following them can be 
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considered mature in liberalisation, since competition can be revealed both in the 
imports/supply and in retail service segments. In the second half of the development rank – 
where countries like the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Lithuania, Poland and 
Slovakia take place – countries are able to cover their energy demand from less, maybe only 
from one source. This couples with concentrated and vertically integrated market structure 
and average governmental involvement. For them the connection to gas market competition 
can risk security of supply as well. That is why some Baltic or Central and Eastern European 
countries might feel to be more defenceless during negotiations with a supplier. Sometimes 
they are more interested in contracting with these actors from outside the EU under a common 
European shield. The rank is closed with Latvia, which needs further investments in gas 
supply and service segments and government actions in the regulation in order to reach more 
competition.  
The success of European energy policy depends on the acceptance of the member 
states (Pointvogl 2009). But the level of their approach shows huge differences according to 
their gas market development stages. This conflict is getting even worse if market opening is 
not coming from market base (competition pull) but it is necessary because of a decision 
coming from outside or from above (liberalisation push). The adversary incumbents or 
national, political groups can even resist with the improper application of relevant EU 
regulations.  
The fact that the EU is unable to have an effect on the whole gas market – particularly 
on importing countries – upgrades the importance of common, unified appearance and 
negotiations with third players even more. The creation of common energy policy is a 
necessary tool of both market efficiency and of security of supply. Compared to this the EU 
also acknowledges that for the present it is unable to create this consequent, common and 
unified opinion, which would be so necessary for energy market and environment objectives. 
The EU-wide conflict of interests makes it impossible, owing to the strategic characteristic of 
the product and its market results that every member state concentrates first on its own 
interests and only secondly on the interest of the EU. So if an actor is not interested in 
accepting EU objectives, the EU is unable to force the desirable liberalisation because of the 
delayed establishment of supranational supervisory and regulative body. These conditions set 
back the creation of an integrated and competitive common energy market.  
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Thesis 5: Energetics can not only be the subject but also the measure of crisis 
management. Considering the wider range of crisis management tools it looks like that 
beyond its donor function energetics receive emphasised attention, so it can even be a 
winner of the present crisis.  
The 2008 crisis has left its signs also on crisis-proof energy sectors. Energy demand 
decreased, although thanks to its inflexibility in lower amount compared to other sectors. The 
fall of investments caused by the decrease of prices and demand and the general uncertainties 
were somehow balanced by surplus of money, political and economic interests coming from 
other sectors.  
Primarily/Mainly national level supports treated the energetic effects of economic 
crisis. However, competition regulation slacked less in connection with this sector and 
supports rather serve development than company-saving. Other measures of crisis 
management – like extra taxes, privatization and the extent of state ownership – can be 
observed here, but mainly in the sense to obtain and assure short or long term income from 
the sector. Energetics became not only the subject but the measure of crisis management.  
Beyond the continuation of liberalization process the European Union is committed to 
the fight against climate change and to energy efficiency. So even if it seems that during the 
economic and now euro-crisis non-financial sectors get into the upstage, it looks like 
energetics are getting more attention. The sector may obtain gains from crisis if approved 
state aids and energy projects with EU financial assistance are realized.  
Future of the European energy market is determined by today’s crisis management 
measures. The period that holds the possibility of changes gives good circumstances to the 
regulative restructure, the strengthening of international coordination even if the lack of 
financial and natural resources restricts the attainment of commonly accepted goals. The next 
few years will show how Europe can exploit the possibilities coming from energetic and 
regulation economic adaptation. The significance of regulation and tax-system changes made 
in the name of “green get-out”, supports from the EU and their execution could be much 
bigger as it is seen from today’s short term interests.  
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